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The Metaphysics of Free Will 
Sarah Woods 
26 April 2015 
        A Morally Consistent Character or Absolute Free Will: Which Should We Choose? 
 
“We are what we repeatedly do. Excellence, then, is not an act, but a habit.” This 
Aristotelian notion of how to lead a virtuous life is one that philosophers and scholars 
alike have respected and praised for centuries. Consistency in choosing the right path is 
the key to leading a fulfilling life, which is a notion many agree upon. While one person 
may hold Aristotelian notions of consistent excellence in character on a pedestal, this 
same person may also believe that in order for one to have free will and moral 
responsibility, one must have the ability at all times to choose A over B, and vice versa. 
This theory of absolute free will is called incompatibilism. Incompatibilists believe that 
one cannot have free will and moral responsibility if any of our actions are determined by 
our past. This leads one to realize that the Aristotelian incompatibilist is constantly at 
odds with himself. He cannot constantly pursue excellence because that would mean his 
actions are determined, and thus lacks free will and moral responsibility. Either the 
Aristotelian incompatibilist must concede his notions of character are much too stringent 
to maintain in reality, or he must accept that one can still have free will and moral 
responsibility while determinism exists. I will assert that it is much more important to 
change our conception of freedom from “absolute without any limits” to “determined by 
the fixity of the past but still compatible with free will and moral responsibility.” The theory 
of pursuing a consistently excellent character should not be discarded simply because 
we cannot have absolute free will. I will draw from Aristotle’s views on moral 
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responsibility, character, ethics, and free will in order to defend my views on character. I 
will reference John Martin Fischer’s The Metaphysics of Free Will to prove that 
determinism still allows for free will and moral responsibility. There are critics who 
believe that constantly pursuing a virtuous character is almost psychologically impossible 
due to environmental situations and overall human instinct. One of these is John Doris 
who wrote a book called Lack of Character, which analyzes whether Aristotelian notions 
of character are even possible when compared with moral psychological problems and 
facts. I will reference his book when providing counterexamples to Aristotelian notions of 
character. I will also be using arguments as counter examples from Fischer's work.  
In order to better elaborate on my thesis, I shall break down my argument into 
premise form. 
1) According to the Aristotle, free will and moral responsibility is determined by our 
character.  
2) According to absolute free will (indeterminism), free actions cannot be 
determined in any fashion. 
3) Therefore, you cannot endorse Aristotle’s view, and also affirm absolute free will. 
(1,2) 
4) Aristotle’s view is correct.  
5) Therefore, the doctrine of incompatibilism is incorrect. (3,4) 
6)  Therefore, it is in our best interests to maintain the Aristotelian notion of 
character and change our notion of free will instead of holding onto an idealized 
notion of free will and discard consistency in character. (4,5) 
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I shall first tackle the Aristotelian notions that our free will and moral responsibility are 
determined by our character. I will then acknowledge John Doris’ theories on character 
and moral psychology which declare that it is virtually impossible to maintain an 
Aristotelian character.In response to Doris, I shall consult Gavin Lawrence’s essay on 
Aristotle and moral psychology, which defends that the weakness of character stems 
from a lack of maturity.Then, I shall move on to expound on the different versions of free 
will. In a separate argument for Premise 5, I shall demonstrate how incompatibilism 
fails, and then defend that compatibilism is the most practical and reasonable form of 
freedom that still allows for free will and moral responsibility. Finally, I will compare 
Aristotle’s views of free will to compatibilism to demonstrate how a limited version of 
free will still leads to a flourishing life. 
 In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle elaborates on how we can determine if 
someone is morally responsible for his actions. He begins the discussion by addressing 
how blameworthiness and praiseworthiness is based on virtue or lack of virtue, whether 
they are compelled or not.1 While this is true in many different situations, there are also 
situations in which how virtuous an act is is conversely related to blameworthiness and 
praiseworthiness. For example, if a woman used self defense against her attacker and 
killed him. She would be ultimately morally responsible for his death, but others would 
praise her for saving herself. It is clear then that moral responsibility can be mutually 
exclusive from blameworthiness and praiseworthiness in certain situations. Aristotle, 
though, shows that it can be hard discerning between a good and evil action due to the 
burden of blameworthiness and praiseworthiness it carries :  
                                               
1
 Terrence Irwin and Gail Fine, Aristotle: Introductory Readings (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 1996), 228. 
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 “It is sometimes hard, however, to judge what <goods> should be chosen at the 
price of what <evils>, and what <evils> should be endured at the price of what <goods>. 
And it is even harder to abide by our judgement, since the results we expect <when we 
endure> are usually painful, and the actions we are compelled <to endure, when we 
choose> are usually shameful. That is why those who have been compelled or not 
compelled receive praise or blame.”2 
This demonstrates how the the value of virtue is not directly correlated with 
blameworthiness and praiseworthiness. One should not let the burden of an action 
determine the value of it. One is morally responsible for all actions (except when 
coerced or manipulated), whether it is blameworthy or praiseworthy.  
 Aristotle also wants us to be held accountable at all times for our actions, but 
there can be some disagreement when it comes to ignorance. Actions done in 
ignorance and caused by ignorance are different according to Aristotle as well, for 
example someone who consciously becomes drunk, but lacks the control over their own 
conscious when drunk.3 But even if decision is out of ignorance, it is “the most proper to 
virtue”4 and should not be taken lightly: 
 “Decision, then, is apparently voluntary, but not the same as what is voluntary, 
which extends more widely. For children and the other animals share in what is 
voluntary, but not in decision; and the actions we do on the spur of the moment are said 
to be voluntary, but not to express decision.”5  
                                               
2
 Terrence Irwin and Gail Fine, Aristotle: Introductory Readings (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 1996), 229. 
3
 Ibid. 228 
4
 Ibid. 232     
5
 Terrence Irwin and Gail Fine, Aristotle: Introductory Readings (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 1996). 232 
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Aristotle shows here that it is not just enough to have the ability to make decisions; it is 
about the intent behind them, which stems from one’s character. Any animal can make 
a rash action, but decision itself requires logic and reasoning. Since Aristotle promotes 
using reasoning to express decision, this in itself determines our actions when deciding 
whether to choose A or B. If A is the more virtuous option, an Aristotelian would choose 
A every time, thus allowing ethical code to determine our future choices when it comes 
to decisions in ethics. To many, this would sound like a limiting life in the sense that one 
is bound to choosing A over B every time. Even though there is a limited sense of free 
will, the Aristotelian is still able to lead a flourishing life worth living.  
 Doris is one that would heavily disagree with the notion that it is even possible to 
have a consistent moral character. In the beginning of his work, Doris uses moral 
psychological situations to demonstrate that one’s decisions cannot be purely based off 
of reasoning alone. He explains that much of our decision making is based off of 
situations and our own personalities.6 One aspect of our personality is especially 
devastating for philosophers:  
 “Imagine my crippling shyness prevents my friendliness from being expressed 
and assume, as seems plausible, the same class of eliciting conditions is relevant to 
each trait; I have the disposition to friendliness, but the conditional would be false, 
because my shyness would cripple my friendliness… The burden of proof lies with 
someone attributing friendliness in the face of repeated failures to act friendly, while 
someone asserting the opposite view occupies an enviable rhetorical position.”7 
                                               
6
 John Doris, Lack of Character: Personality (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 13 
7
 John Doris, Lack of Character: Personality (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 16 
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Doris posits a devastating argument against Aristotle’s notions of character. I shall 
outline it in premise form for clarity: 
1) To show that one is a morally conscious person, one must perform morally 
conscious acts. 
2) A characteristic such as shyness can keep one from performing morally 
conscious acts. 
3) Therefore, one cannot truly be morally conscious if they cannot perform morally 
conscious acts. 
Well, as Doris points out, Aristotle does assert that it is one’s activity as a virtuous 
person that is paramount, not the foundation itself.8 Unfortunately, this poses another 
separate problem: what is more important, the actions themselves or the intent and 
conscious decision making behind them? Would it be any worse if an innately selfish 
person saved someone’s life only in order to make themselves look better? The 
consequentialist, whom only looks at actions themselves to determine morality, would 
say that only the action itself leading to saving a life would matter in this incident and 
would deem the selfish person virtuous. The deontologist, whom analyzes the 
objectives behind actions to determine morality, on the other hand would deem the 
action as not completely moral, since the intent behind it was not virtuous in nature. The 
deontologist would even go as far to say that the virtuous act itself would not have been 
performed if it did not make the selfish person look better to others, or if there was no 
kind of benefit for them from saving someone’s life. Opposed from both 
consequentialism and deontology, Aristotle actually proposes a third different view 
called Virtue Theory: 
                                               
8
 Ibid, 17 
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“[Virtue Theory] deemphasizes rules, consequences and particular acts and 
places the focus on the kind of person who is acting. The issue is not primarily whether 
an intention is right, though that is important; nor is it primarily whether one is following 
the correct rule; nor is it primarily whether the consequences of action are good, though 
these factors are not irrelevant. What is primary is whether the person acting is 
expressing good character (moral virtues) or not.”9 
This is important to consider because this actually helps support Doris’ argument in a 
way. If one is never able to express good character in their actions, then no one would 
know that they had a good character. Aristotle’s Virtue Theory leans more towards 
consequentialism than deontology. While in most situations I consider myself a 
consequentialist, having that virtuous foundation is definitely important when choosing A 
over B. Having that solid morality within ourselves is the only way we can consistently 
choose the more virtuous choice, despite character traits and situations. 
 In Gavin Lawrence’s essay Acquiring Character: Becoming a Grown-Up, 
Lawrence acknowledges that through Aristotle’s ethics, character is not necessarily 
something one is born with. Character requires maturity and consistency in action. If 
one is not able to maintain a good character, they are seen as immature and lacking of 
self control.10 This sense of character control changes one from just a reactionary being 
into a cognisant and reason driven individual: 
 “This is a transition (i) from attraction to evaluation, from acting and reacting 
simply ‘as we like’,with, or out of, pleasure and pain, to acting as we think fit, fine, and 
                                               
9
 Dr. Garrett, “Virtue Ethics,” Virtue Theory, last modified November 28, 2005, accessed May 2, 
2015,http://people.wku.edu/jan.garrett/ethics/virtthry.htm. 
10
 Michael Pakaluk and Giles Pearson, Author: Gavin Lawrence, Moral Psychology and Human Action in 
Aristotle: Acquiring Character: Becoming Grown-Up (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011), 237. 
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valuable; (ii) a transition from the rough and ready responses of nature and basic 
habituated practice to the more finely attuned, more situationally contoured, imaginative 
and creative, responses of reason-imbued sensitivities…”11 
This demonstrates that establishing character is not only about striving to pursue virtue. 
It is also about, in a sense, becoming more human by developing reasoning. The 
transitions one undergoes from no foundations to moral foundations comes with the 
benefits of imagination and creativity along with thinking logically and reasonably. Thus, 
one should not disregard Aristotle’s notions of character just because moral psychology 
shows that situations and personality traits can affect one’s actions contrary to their true 
character foundation. Developing a solid moral foundation within one’s self and pursuing 
the utmost good is of the highest importance in order to mature as a human being, even 
if we are prone to being swayed by our surroundings.  
 Since I have effectively expounded on the foundations of Aristotle’s notions of 
character and engaged the moral psychological counterexamples, I shall next take into 
account John Martin Fischer’s The Metaphysics of Free Will in order to properly 
elaborate on free will and what it means when we say “absolute free will.” There are 
three main theories on free will that effectively cover the whole range of possibilities: 
hard determinism, compatibilism, and libertarianism. Hard determinism is the extreme 
case of free will in which all of our actions are dictated by our past and character, so 
one has no sense of free will, and little sense of moral responsibility. Compatibilism is 
the middle ground in which determinism still exists, but one still has the ability to choose 
A over B if they have a second order desire to do so. For example, one is still able to 
conquer their addiction to cocaine if they have a stronger personal desire to be a good 
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 Ibid.  237 
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role model for their children. While determinism does guide one towards one option, 
there is still that sense of free will and moral responsibility in compatibilism since the 
other options can still be chosen. Libertarianism, or absolute free will, is the most liberal 
in the free will spectrum. Determinism does not exist to libertarians, and alternate 
possibilities are necessary for moral responsibility and free will, so we are able to fully 
freely choose A or B with no restrictions.  
Randomness and luck are big factors that many criticize indeterminism for. If a 
indeterminist were to make a choice between a virtue and a vice, he would have to flip a 
coin in order to allow for alternative possibilities, even if the indeterminist were a 
virtuous person. How is one suppose to live a flourishing life if it is simply based on luck 
that one does the right thing? Even though there are such devastating claims against 
incompatibilism, Peter van Inwagen is one philosopher that still believes that if 
determinism existed, then we would have no free will whatsoever. van Inwagen believes 
that determinism cannot be in effect if someone wants to answer the phone, but calls 
into doubt his own free will and thus refuses to answer the phone, even though he 
reasonably should answer.12 Fischer though makes the claim that: 
 “(1) the agent can generate the a desire of the second sort, (2) he can try and act 
on this desire, and (3) and if the agent were to try to act on this sort of desire, he would 
succeed, the the agent can (during the relevant temporal period) refrain from answering 
the phone, even though he lacks any desire to do other than answer the phone.”13 
Fischer shows that even if the person is determined in their first order desire to answer 
the phone, he can still refrain from answering the phone if we have the second order 
                                               
12
 John Martin Fischer, The Metaphysics of Free Will (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers Inc, 1994), 52 
13
 Ibid, 52 
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desire. In this way, one can still have moral responsibility and free will, even though 
determinism is in effect. One does not necessarily need to give up the notion of 
determinism in order to have a sense of free will and moral responsibility.  
 Most people seem to hold the incompatibilist view, but after a closer look into 
compatibilism, it seems to be the most reasonable form of free will. Why is this? It 
seems to be that most people do not have a full concept of free will when they talk 
about it or think about it. It is a common occurrence for one to think initially that it is 
better to have as many options as possible, so absolute free will is the most ideal 
theory. But, indeterminism itself, once studied on an academic level, is quickly seen as 
not the ideal theory. Indeterminism does not allow for any factors of the past to affect 
our decision making, even though it is common knowledge that in order to be 
reasonable, logical persons, we must consult the past in order to lead a flourishing life 
and not make the same mistake twice. And hard determinism is too strict with decision 
making, so it is hard for most to see how one can have free will and moral responsibility 
when they can only choose A over B. Thus, it is the most reasonable to choose 
compatibilism as the most sensible form of free will.   
 As I have shown thus far, the notion of Aristotelian character and incompatibilism 
are not compatible with one another. One must choose either to believe absolute free 
will or a consistently moral character is a better one to pursue. As I have previously 
stated before, I hold that it is much more important to pursue an Aristotelian notion of 
character and have a limited sense of free will (in the form of compatibilism). Next, I 
shall expand on how compatibilism allows us the amount of free will and moral 
responsibility we need in order to lead fulfilling lives.  
11 
 One of the ways compatibilists are able to show that one still has moral 
responsibility through determinism is by giving Frankfurt-type examples. One of the 
most famous Frankfurt examples is Locke’s example. Locke describes a group of 
friends in a room and how they are enjoying their time together in a room. Unbeknownst 
to them, a mysterious figure locks the door while they are together. They are not aware 
of this, and do not wish to leave the room, so they stay of their own free will and 
continue to spend time together. When they get up to leave, the mysterious figure 
unlocks the door, and they are able to leave the room with no knowledge they were 
locked inside of it the whole time. These types of examples in which the agent has 
guidance control (control over their own actions) but lacks regulative control (control 
over the whole situation itself) demonstrate that one still has enough free will and 
control in order to have moral responsibility. Fischer expounds on Frankfurt examples 
later in his book:  
 “The Frankfurt-type cases, unusual as they are, may well point us to something 
as significant as it is mundane. When we are morally responsible for our actions, we do 
possess a kind of control. So the traditional assumption of the association of moral 
responsibility (and personhood) with control is quite correct. But it need not be the sort 
of control that involves alternate possibilities.”14 
As demonstrated through these examples, Fischer is able to prove that it is not the 
overall control of events that necessarily makes one morally responsible, but the control 
over the agent’s own actions that makes one morally culpable.  
 Many incompatibilists would object to the Frankfurt examples based on the fact 
that it seems as though the agent still does not have any control over his situation. For 
                                               
14
 John Martin Fischer, The Metaphysics of Free Will (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers Inc, 1994),133 
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instance, the mysterious figure is in control the whole time, so the agent technically 
cannot leave the room if the mysterious figure does not allow him to. Fischer  introduces 
the counter theory “the flicker of freedom strategy”, originally formulated by libertarians, 
in order to demonstrate how the agent really does have moral responsibility with only 
guidance control.15 Fischer details four different versions of this theory, but I shall only 
expound on the first one. Fischer describes a scenario in which Jones is a free agent 
and Black is the one with the regulative control.16 Jones freely chooses to vote for 
Clinton over Bush, and Black does not interfere with this decision making because he 
wants him to vote for Clinton. But, if Black even for a second thinks or exposes in some 
way that he wants to vote for Bush instead, then Black will immediately interfere. 
Fischer continues: 
 “But again a flicker emerges, for even here Jones has the power to show the 
relevant sign - to blush red or display the complex neurophysiological pattern, and so 
forth. And it is hard to see how a Frankfurt-type example could be constructed which 
would have absolutely no such flicker. … Thus, it appears that, no matter how 
sophisticated the Frankfurt-type example, if one traces “backward” far enough, one will 
find a flicker of freedom.”17 
Fischer defends that this is a weak argument from libertarians, since it is hard to even 
spot the “flicker of freedom”. One must remember that Frankfurt examples are meant to 
demonstrate that one still has moral responsibility even in the most extreme cases. We 
all hope that there really is not a mysterious figure controlling our every action. Overall 
though, the Frankfurt-type examples definitely do demonstrate how we can still  be 
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 Ibid. 134 
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 Ibid. 136 
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 John Martin Fischer, The Metaphysics of Free Will (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers Inc, 1994). 136 
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morally responsible even if we do not have free will (in the sense of having alternate 
possibilities). 
 Thus far I have elaborated on all the main spectrums of free will and have shown 
the best and most reasonable method is compatibilism. Now, I shall demonstrate how 
Aristotle’s own views of free will line up with causal determinism and compatibilism. In 
Anthony Kenny’s work Aristotle’s Theory of the Will, Kenny analyzes different aspects of 
free will in accordance with Aristotle’s own works. He first focuses on the issue of 
voluntariness in Eudemian Ethics. Kenny begins with Aristotle addressing, “‘We are 
praised for virtue, we are praised for what we are responsible for or cause, we cause 
voluntary actions, so let us investigate voluntariness.’”18 Aristotle then continues to use 
geometry and math to show that principles are caused by consequential properties.19 
This alone demonstrates how Aristotle believed that forms of causal determinism were 
in fact in effect. But, Aristotle did in fact believe in some things resting on luck: 
 “Either reading, it seems to me, is an expression of something which Aristotle 
believed: some things depend on men, in the sense of being within the competence of 
human nature, without being contingent in the sense of avoidable; and some things are 
contingent without being the results of human intervention: e.g. matters of luck.”20 
Aristotle understood that certain factors in the world were beyond our control. This view 
of the world and voluntariness lines up very well with compatibilism, which 
demonstrates that one can pursue virtuous actions within their guidance control and 
lead a flourishing life while lacking regulative control.  
                                               
18
 Anthony Kenny, Aristotle's Theory of the Will (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), 4 
19
 Anthony Kenny, Aristotle's Theory of the Will (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979). 4-5 
20
 Ibid. 7 
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 In conclusion, it is much more important to develop and pursue a consistently 
good character, as exemplified by Aristotle’s ethics, and appreciate the limited amount 
of free will we have rather than disregard the notion of Aristotelian character for the 
sake of absolute free will. As I iterated before, absolute free will is not what most people 
understand it to be. Most do not understand how randomized our choices would be if we 
decided to believe in having absolute free will. Logical reasoning altogether would be 
thrown out the window. As also defended previously, building and having a virtuous 
character is not all about demonstrating it all the time. It is part of the growth of a human 
being when it comes to emotional and logical maturity. One can still have a virtuous 
character and make situational or personality driven mistakes sometimes. This does not 
take away from their growth into a mature, reasoning person. Much like pursuing a 
morally consistent character, accepting a limited version of free will does not limit one 
from cultivating a flourishing life. One does not need full control over both the guidance 
and regulative controls in order to be morally responsible. One only needs guidance 
control in order to have moral responsibility, and as demonstrated before, compatibilism 
allows us this. At the end of the day, in order to lead fulfilling lives, it is of the utmost 
importance to pursue always the more virtuous path, even if in this goal we are 
determined to do so.  
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Description of Revisions: 
1) I clarified certain points throughout the paper, such as making an outline of Doris’ 
argument and ignorance when drunk. 
2) I did small edits such as cutting out certain sections you said to cut out.  
3) I fixed my error of not giving the libertarians’ credit for the “flicker of freedom” 
theory. 
4) I did the small edit to one of the footnote bibliographies.  
 
  
 
 
